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A set of networks G is pairwise farsightedly stable (i) if all possible farsighted pairwise
deviations from any network g ∈ G to a network outside G are deterred by the threat of
ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improving path from
any network outside the set leading to some network in the set, and (iii) if there is no
proper subset of G satisfying conditions (i) and (ii). A non-empty pairwise farsightedly
stable set always exists. We provide a full characterization of unique pairwise farsightedly
stable sets of networks. Contrary to other pairwise concepts, pairwise farsighted stability
yields a Pareto dominant network, if it exists, as the unique outcome. Finally, we study the
relationship between pairwise farsighted stability and other concepts such as the largest
pairwise consistent set and the von Neumann–Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable
set.
© 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The organization of individual agents into networks and groups or coalitions plays an important role in the determina-
tion of the outcome of many social and economic interactions. For instance, networks of personal contacts are important in
obtaining information on goods and services, like product information or information about job opportunities. Many com-
modities are traded through networks of buyers and sellers. The partitioning of societies into groups is also important in
many contexts, such as the provision of public goods and the formation of alliances, cartels, and federations.
A simple way to analyze the networks that one might expect to emerge in the long run is to examine the requirement
that individuals do not benefit from altering the structure of the network. An example of such a condition is the pairwise
stability notion defined by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).1 Their approach is static and myopic. Individuals are not forward-
looking in the sense that they do not forecast how others might react to their actions. For instance, individuals might not
add a link that appears valuable to them given the current network, as that might in turn lead to the formation of other
links and ultimately lower the payoffs of the original individuals.
A dynamic (but still myopic) network formation process has been recently studied by Jackson and Watts (2002), who
have proposed a dynamic process in which individuals form and sever links based on the improvement that the resulting
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: P.Herings@algec.unimaas.nl (P.J.J. Herings), mauleon@fusl.ac.be (A. Mauleon), vincent.vannetelbosch@uclouvain.be (V. Vannetelbosch).
1 There are alternative ways to model network stability. One is to explicitly model a game by which links form and then to solve that game using the
concept of Nash equilibrium or one of its refinements. See Aumann and Myerson (1988) and Dutta and Mutuswami (1997). Jackson (2003, 2005) provides
surveys of models of network formation.0899-8256/$ – see front matter © 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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network or may cycle.
In this paper we address the question which networks one might expect to emerge in the long run when players are
farsighted. Since most of the literature considers the case where at most one link is changed at a time, we will also
restrict our analysis to network formation processes with this characteristic. This enables us to make the best comparison
of our results to those found in the literature. It is straightforward to adapt our concept to more general network formation
processes.
We first extend the Jackson and Wolinsky pairwise stability notion to a new set-valued solution concept, called the
pairwise myopically stable set. A set of networks G is pairwise myopically stable (i) if all possible myopic pairwise deviations
from any network g ∈ G to a network outside the set are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off,
(ii) if there exists a myopic improving path from any network outside the set leading to some network in the set, and (iii) if
there is no proper subset of G satisfying conditions (i) and (ii). We show that there is a unique pairwise myopically stable
set and that it is equal to the collection of closed cycles. It follows that the pairwise myopically stable set is non-empty and
contains all pairwise stable networks.
We then introduce the pairwise farsightedly stable set, to predict which networks may be formed among farsighted
players. The definition corresponds to the one of a pairwise myopically stable set with myopic deviations and myopic
improving paths replaced by farsighted deviations and farsighted improving paths. A farsighted improving path is a sequence
of networks that can emerge when players form or sever links based on the improvement the end network offers relative
to the current network. Each network in the sequence differs by one link from the previous one. If a link is added, then
the two players involved must both prefer the end network to the current network, with at least one of the two strictly
preferring the end network. If a link is deleted, then it must be that at least one of the two players involved in the link
strictly prefers the end network.
In contrast to other concepts incorporating farsightedness, we do not only request that all possible pairwise deviations
out of the set are deterred by the threat of ending worse off, but also that there exists a farsighted improving path from any
network outside the set leading to some network in the set. This property is equivalent to the requirement that networks
within the set are robust to perturbations. Perturbations may be due to exogenous forces acting on the network, or simply
miscalculations or errors on the part of an individual making an assessment or taking an action.2
We show that a pairwise farsightedly stable set always exists and we provide a full characterization of unique pairwise
farsightedly stable sets of networks. As a corollary, we give the necessary and sufficient condition such that a unique
pairwise farsightedly stable set consisting of a single network exists. We apply these results to examples, such as the
criminal network model of Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2004). We find that in criminal networks with n players, the set
consisting of the complete network (where all criminals are linked to each other) is a pairwise farsightedly stable set.
We consider the relationship between farsighted stability and efficiency of networks. We provide conditions under which
pairwise farsighted stability singles out a strongly efficient network. We show that if there is a network that Pareto domi-
nates all other networks, then that network is the unique prediction of pairwise farsighted stability. This property does not
hold for other pairwise solution concepts.
Finally, we study the relationship between pairwise farsighted stability and other farsighted concepts such as the largest
pairwise consistent set, a notion due to Chwe (1994), and the von Neumann–Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable set.
Under some conditions, a pairwise farsightedly stable set is a subset of the set of pairwise stable networks, which in turn
is a subset of the largest pairwise consistent set. We show that any von Neumann–Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable
set is also a pairwise farsightedly stable set. Under some conditions, also the reverse statement holds. By means of examples
we show that pairwise farsightedly stable sets have no relationship to either largest pairwise consistent sets or pairwise
myopically stable sets.
Although the literature on stability in networks is well established and growing (see Jackson, 2005), the literature on
farsighted stability is still in its infancy. Page Jr. et al. (2005) address the issue of farsighted stability in network formation
by extending Chwe’s (1994) result on the nonemptiness of farsightedly consistent sets. In order to demonstrate the existence
of farsightedly consistent directed networks, they provide a new framework that extends the standard notion of a directed
network and also introduces the notion of a supernetwork. A supernetwork specifies how the different directed networks are
connected via coalitional moves and coalitional preferences, and thus provides a network representation of agent preferences
and the rules governing network formation. A supernetwork is equivalent to the social environment studied by Chwe (1994),
when the set of outcomes is replaced by the set of directed networks. Given the rules governing network formation and
agents’ preferences as represented via the supernetwork, a directed network (i.e., a particular node in the supernetwork)
is said to be farsightedly consistent if no agent or coalition of agents is willing to alter the network (via the addition,
subtraction, or replacement of arcs) in fear that such an alteration might induce further network alterations by other agents
or coalitions that in the end leave the initially deviating agent or coalition no better off, and possibly worse off. They have
shown that for any supernetwork corresponding to a given collection of directed networks, the set of farsightedly consistent
networks is non-empty; see also Page Jr. et al. (2005).
2 Jackson and Watts (2002) use improving paths as the foundation for a stochastic analysis, where in addition to intended changes in the network,
unintended mutations or errors are introduced. However, in their definition of improving path it is assumed that players behave myopically: all a player
needs to know is whether adding or deleting a given link is directly beneficial to him or her under the current circumstances.
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the desirability of a move in terms of its consequences on the entire discounted stream of payoffs. Contrary to ours, their
model is in spirit closer to non-cooperative game theory. They show that a Markovian equilibrium process of network
formation exists and they provide two conditions, link monotonicity and increasing returns to link creation, each of which
guarantees that there is some equilibrium at which the complete graph is reached in the limit from all initial networks.
They also show that there are valuation structures in which the process will not converge to any efficient network for
any equilibrium strategy profile. This can be viewed as the dynamic counterpart of the conflict between static stability
and efficiency demonstrated by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), a conflict that is also confirmed by our results. Dutta et al.
(2005) provide an example where there is a network that Pareto dominates all other networks, but which is not reached
in equilibrium. In our framework, such an example is not possible. If there is a network that Pareto dominates all other
networks, then that network is the unique prediction of pairwise farsighted stability. Other approaches to farsightedness
in network formation are suggested by the work of Xue (1998), Herings et al. (2004), and Mauleon and Vannetelbosch
(2004).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce some notations and basic properties and definitions for
networks. In Section 3 we define the notion of pairwise myopically stable set of networks. In Section 4 we define the notion
of pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks and we characterize it in Section 5. In Section 6 we consider the symmetric
connections model and the co-author model. We look at the relationship between farsighted stability and efficiency of
networks in Section 7. In Sections 8 and 9 we analyze, respectively, the relationship with the von Neumann–Morgenstern
pairwise farsightedly stable set and the largest pairwise consistent set. Finally, in Section 10 we conclude.
2. Networks
Let N = {1, . . . ,n} be the finite set of players who are connected in some network relationship. The network relationships
are reciprocal and the network is thus modeled as a non-directed graph. Individuals are the nodes in the graph and links
indicate bilateral relationships between individuals. Thus, a network g is simply a list of which pairs of individuals are
linked to each other. We write i j ∈ g to indicate that i and j are linked under the network g . Let gN be the collection
of all subsets of N with cardinality 2, so gN is the complete network. The set of all possible networks or graphs on N is
denoted by G and consists of all subsets of gN . The network obtained by adding link i j to an existing network g is denoted
g + i j and the network that results from deleting link i j from an existing network g is denoted g − i j. For any network g ,
let N(g) = {i | there is j such that i j ∈ g} be the set of players who have at least one link in the network g . A path in a
network g ∈ G between i and j is a sequence of players i1, . . . , iK such that ikik+1 ∈ g for each k ∈ {1, . . . , K −1} with i1 = 1
and iK = j. A non-empty network h ⊆ g is a component of g , if for all i ∈ N(h) and j ∈ N(h) \ {i}, there exists a path in h
connecting i and j, and for any i ∈ N(h) and j ∈ N(g), i j ∈ g implies i j ∈ h. The set of components of g is denoted by C(g).
Knowing the components of a network, we can partition the players into groups within which players are connected. Let
Π(g) denote the partition of N induced by the network g .3
A value function is a function v : G → R that keeps track of how the total societal value varies across different networks.
The set of all possible value functions is denoted by V . An allocation rule is a function Y : G × V → RN that keeps track of
how the value is allocated or distributed among the players forming a network. It satisfies
∑
i∈N Yi(g, v) = v(g) for all v
and g .
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) have proposed a number of basic properties of value and allocation functions. A value
function is component additive if v(g) = ∑h∈C(g) v(h) for all g ∈ G. Component additive value functions are the ones for
which the value of a network is the sum of the value of its components. An allocation rule Y is component balanced if for
any component additive v ∈ V , g ∈ G, and h ∈ C(g), we have ∑i∈N(h) Yi(h, v) = v(h). Component balancedness only puts
conditions on Y for v ’s that are component additive, so Y can be arbitrary otherwise. Given a permutation of players π
and any g ∈ G, let gπ = {π(i)π( j) | i j ∈ g}. Thus, gπ is a network that is identical to g up to a permutation of the players.
A value function is anonymous if for any permutation π and any g ∈ G, v(gπ ) = v(g). Given a permutation π , let vπ be
defined by vπ (g) = v(gπ−1 ) for each g ∈ G. An allocation rule Y is anonymous if for any v ∈ V , g ∈ G, and permutation π ,
we have Yπ(i)(gπ , vπ ) = Yi(g, v).4
An allocation rule that is component balanced and anonymous is the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule. For a
component additive v and network g , the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule Y ce is such that for any h ∈ C(g) and
each i ∈ N(h), Y cei (g, v) = v(h)/#N(h). For a v that is not component additive, Y ce(g, v) = v(g)/n for all g; thus, Y ce splits
the value v(g) equally among all players if v is not component additive.
In evaluating societal welfare, we may take various perspectives. A network g is Pareto efficient relative to v and Y if
there does not exist any g′ ∈ G such that Yi(g′, v)  Yi(g, v) for all i with at least one strict inequality. A network g ∈ G
is strongly efficient relative to v if v(g)  v(g′) for all g′ ∈ G. This is a strong notion of efficiency as it takes the perspective
that value is fully transferable.
3 Throughout the paper we use the notation ⊆ for weak inclusion and  for strict inclusion. Finally, # will refer to the notion of cardinality.
4 Anonymous value functions are those such that the architecture of a network matters, but not the labels of individuals. Anonymity of an allocation rule
requires that if only the labels of the agents change and the value generated by networks changes in an exactly corresponding fashion, then the allocation
only changes according to the relabeling.
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Wolinsky, 1996) are deviations involving a single link at a time. Moreover, link addition is bilateral (two players that would
be involved in the link must agree to adding the link), link deletion is unilateral (at least one player involved in the link
must agree to deleting the link), and network changes take place one link at a time. Coalitionwise deviations (Jackson and
van den Nouweland, 2005) are deviations involving several links and some group of players at a time. Link addition is
bilateral, link deletion is unilateral, and multiple link changes can take place at a time. Whether a pairwise deviation or a
coalitionwise deviation makes more sense will depend on the setting within which network formation takes place.
We will restrict our analysis to pairwise deviations. A simple way to analyze the networks that one might expect to
emerge in the long run is to examine the requirement that agents do not benefit from altering the structure of the network.
A weak version of such a condition is the pairwise stability notion defined by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). A network is
pairwise stable if no player benefits from severing one of their links and no other two players benefit from adding a link
between them, with one benefiting strictly and the other at least weakly. Formally, a network g is pairwise stable with
respect to value function v and allocation rule Y if
(i) for all i j ∈ g , Yi(g, v)  Yi(g − i j, v) and Y j(g, v)  Y j(g − i j, v), and
(ii) for all i j /∈ g , if Yi(g, v) < Yi(g + i j, v) then Y j(g, v) > Y j(g + i j, v).
We say that g′ is adjacent to g if g′ = g + i j or g′ = g − i j for some i j. A network g′ defeats g if either g′ = g − i j and
Yi(g′, v) > Yi(g, v) or Y j(g′, v) > Y j(g, v), or if g′ = g + i j with Yi(g′, v)  Yi(g, v) and Y j(g′, v)  Y j(g, v) with at least
one inequality holding strictly. Pairwise stability is equivalent to the statement of not being defeated by another network.5
3. Pairwise myopically stable sets of networks
Pairwise stable networks do not always exist. Following Jackson and Watts (2002), we introduce the notion of myopic
improving path. A myopic improving path is a sequence of networks that can emerge when players form or sever links
based on the improvement the resulting network offers relative to the current network. Each network in the sequence
differs by one link from the previous one. If a link is added, then the two players involved must both prefer the resulting
network to the current network, with at least one of the two strictly preferring the resulting network. If a link is deleted,
then it must be that at least one of the two players involved in the link strictly prefers the resulting network.
Definition 1. A myopic improving path from a network g to a network g′ = g is a finite sequence of graphs g1, . . . , gK with
g1 = g and gK = g′ such that for any k ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1} either:
(i) gk+1 = gk − i j for some i j such that Yi(gk+1, v) > Yi(gk, v) or Y j(gk+1, v) > Y j(gk, v), or
(ii) gk+1 = gk + i j for some i j such that Yi(gk+1, v) > Yi(gk, v) and Y j(gk+1, v)  Y j(gk, v).
A myopic improving path is a sequence of adjacent networks that might be observed in a dynamic process where players
are adding and deleting links, one at a time. If there exists a myopic improving path from g to g′ , then we write g → g′ .
For a given network g , let M(g) = {g′ ∈ G | g → g′}. This is the set of networks that can be reached by a myopic improving
path from g . Thus, g → g′ means that g′ is the endpoint of at least one myopic improving path from g . Notice that if g is
pairwise stable then M(g) = ∅.
It is well known that there are many allocation rules and value functions for which pairwise stable networks do not
exist. We therefore consider a set-valued solution concept that captures the pairwise stability notion, called the pairwise
myopically stable set of networks.
Definition 2. A set of networks G ⊆ G is pairwise myopically stable with respect v and Y if
(i) ∀ g ∈ G ,
(ia) ∀i j /∈ g such that g + i j /∈ G , (Yi(g + i j, v), Y j(g + i j, v)) = (Yi(g, v), Y j(g, v)) or Yi(g + i j, v) < Yi(g, v) or Y j(g +
i j, v) < Y j(g, v),
(ib) ∀i j ∈ g such that g − i j /∈ G , Yi(g − i j, v)  Yi(g, v) and Y j(g − i j, v)  Y j(g, v),
(ii) ∀g′ ∈ G \ G , M(g′) ∩ G = ∅,
(iii) G ′  G such that G ′ satisfies conditions (ia), (ib), and (ii).
Conditions (ia) and (ib) in Definition 2 capture deterrence of external deviations. In condition (ia) the addition of a link
i j to a network g ∈ G that leads to a network outside G is deterred because the two players involved do not prefer the
5 Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005) have proposed a refinement of pairwise stability where coalitionwise deviations are allowed: the strongly
stable networks. A strongly stable network is a network which is stable against changes in links by any coalition of individuals. Strongly stable networks
are Pareto efficient and maximize the overall value of the network if the value of each component of a network is allocated equally among the members
of that component.
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Condition (ii) requires external stability. External stability asks for the existence of a myopic improving path from any
network outside G leading to some network in G . Condition (ii) implies that if a set of networks is pairwise myopically
stable, it is non-empty. Notice that the set G (trivially) satisfies conditions (ia), (ib), and (ii) in Definition 2. This motivates
condition (iii), the minimality condition.
Jackson and Watts (2002) define the notion of a closed cycle. A set of networks C is a cycle if for any g ∈ C and
g′ ∈ C \ {g}, there exists a myopic improving path connecting g to g′ . A cycle C is a maximal cycle if it is not a proper
subset of a cycle. A cycle C is a closed cycle if no network in C lies on a myopic improving path leading to a network that is
not in C . A closed cycle is necessarily a maximal cycle. If g is a pairwise stable network, then trivially {g} is a closed cycle.
Lemma 1. For every g ∈ G, either g is pairwise stable or there is a closed cycle C such that C ⊆ M(g).
Proof. Consider a network g ∈ G that is not pairwise stable. Construct a sequence of networks g1, . . . , gk such that g1 = g ,
g j+1 ∈ M(g j) for j = 1, . . . ,k − 1, and either M(gk) = ∅ or gk = g j for some j < k. In the former case, gk is pairwise stable
and by transitivity of M , {gk} ⊆ M(g). In the latter case, let C1 be a maximal cycle containing {g j, . . . , gk−1}. Either C1 is
a closed cycle and we are done, or it has a myopic improving path going out of it, leading to a new maximal cycle C2.
Repeating this argument we reach after a finite number of steps a maximal cycle without myopic improving paths going
out of it, i.e. a closed cycle. 
Lemma 1 confirms the result of Jackson and Watts (2002) that for any value function and allocation rule there exists at
least one closed cycle of networks. The next result claims that there is a unique pairwise myopically stable set of networks.
It contains all networks that belong to a closed cycle.
Theorem 1. The set of networks consisting of all networks that belong to a closed cycle is the unique pairwise myopically stable set.
Proof. Let G be the set consisting of all networks that belong to a closed cycle. We show that G satisfies conditions (i)–(iii).
Obviously, G satisfies condition (i). The set G also satisfies condition (ii). Indeed, consider some g′ /∈ G . By Lemma 1, either
g′ is pairwise stable or there is a closed cycle C such that C ⊆ M(g′). The former case contradicts g′ /∈ G . The latter case
implies g ∈ M(g′) for some g ∈ G , i.e. implies condition (ii). Suppose G does not satisfy condition (iii). Let G ′  G satisfy
conditions (i) and (ii). Let g be a network that belongs to G but not to G ′ . If g is pairwise stable, then there is no g′ ∈ G ′
such that g′ ∈ M(g), so G ′ violates condition (ii). The network g is therefore part of a closed cycle C consisting of at least
two networks. Moreover, for every ḡ ∈ C it holds that g ∈ M(ḡ). If C ∩ G ′ = ∅, we violate condition (ii). If C ∩ G ′ contains a
network ḡ , then g ∈ M(ḡ) implies that condition (i) is violated. It follows that a set G ′  G satisfying conditions (i) and (ii)
does not exist, so G is a pairwise myopically stable set.
Next we show that if a set of networks G satisfies conditions (i)–(iii), then G consists of all networks that belong to
a closed cycle. If G does not contain a pairwise stable network, then we have a contradiction to condition (ii). If G does
not contain some network that belongs to a closed cycle with at least two elements, then we have a contradiction to
condition (i). It follows that G contains all networks that belong to a closed cycle. Condition (iii) together with the first part
of the proof now yields that G cannot contain any other networks. 
Sengupta and Sengupta (1994) define an indirect dominance relation for transferable utility games in coalition structure
that is analogous to our notion of an improving path. Following them, we can define a network g to be viable if for every
network g′ ∈ M(g) it holds that g ∈ M(g′). It is easily verified that any viable network g belongs to a closed cycle. Indeed,
if g is viable, then M(g) is a closed cycle, and vice versa. We can therefore rephrase Theorem 1 as the statement that the
unique pairwise myopically stable set coincides with the set of viable networks.
4. Pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks
We start this section with an example that shows the limitations of the pairwise myopically stable set and that motivates
the incorporation of an appropriate notion of farsightedness.
Example 1 (Criminal networks). 6 Each player is a criminal. If two players are connected, then they are part of the same
criminal network. Each group of connected criminals has a positive probability of winning the loot. The loot is divided
among the connected criminals based on the network architecture. Criminal i’s payoff is given by
Yi(g) = pi(g) ·
[
yi(g) · (1 − φ)
] + (1 − pi(g)) · yi(g)
= yi(g) ·
[
1 − pi(g) · φ
]
,
6 This is a simplified version of Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2004) where, in addition to forming links with criminal mates, criminals choose their level
of criminal activities and whether or not to be involved in criminal activities.
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where yi(g) is i’s expected share of the loot, pi(g) is i’s probability of being caught, and φ > 0 is the penalty rate.7 Beside
being competitors in the crime market, criminals may also benefit from having criminal mates. It is assumed that (i) the
bigger the group of connected criminals, the higher its probability of getting the loot, and (ii) the higher the number of links
a criminal has, the lower his individual probability of being caught. Suppose the probability of being caught for criminal i
is simply given by
pi(g) = n − 1 − ni
n
,
with ni the number of links criminal i has.8 For any group S ∈ Π(g) of connected criminals, let n(S) = maxi∈S [ni]. A criminal
i that is part of a group S ∈ Π(g) expects a share of the loot B > 0 given by
yi(g) = |S|
n
· αi(g) · B,
where |S|/n is the probability that group S will win the loot, and αi(g) is the share of the loot criminal i ∈ S would obtain,




#{ j∈S|n j=n(S)} if ni = n(S),
0 otherwise.
That is, within each component, the criminal who has the highest number of links gets the loot. If two or more criminals
have the highest number of links, then they share the loot equally among them. In Fig. 1 we have depicted the 3-player case
with all payoffs in 1/9th’s. For φ < 3/2, both the partial networks (g1, g2, g3) and the complete network (g7) are pairwise
stable networks. There are four closed cycles, {g1}, {g2}, {g3}, and {g7}. The pairwise myopically stable set of networks is
therefore given by {g1, g2, g3, g7}. For φ  3/2, the complete network g7 is the only pairwise stable network. There is only
one closed cycle, {g7}, which is therefore also the pairwise myopically stable set of networks.
Take some strictly positive φ smaller than 3/2 in Example 1. The partial networks g1, g2, and g3 are pairwise stable.
Notice that two links have to be added to a partial network g1, g2, or g3 to form the complete network g7. Farsighted
players may decide to add one link to a network like g1, g2, or g3, accepting a loss, in the expectation that a further link
will be added to form the complete network. A farsighted improving path is a sequence of networks that can emerge when
players form or sever links based on the improvement the end network offers relative to the current network. Each network
in the sequence differs by one link from the previous one. If a link is added, then the two players involved must both prefer
the end network to the current network, with at least one of the two strictly preferring the end network. If a link is deleted,
then it must be that at least one of the two players involved in the link strictly prefers the end network. We now introduce
the formal definition of a farsighted improving path.
Definition 3. A farsighted improving path from a network g to a network g′ = g is a finite sequence of graphs g1, . . . , gK
with g1 = g and gK = g′ such that for any k ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1} either:
7 The value function v is simply v(g) = ∑i∈N Yi(g). Since v is fixed, we omit it in the notation of Yi(v, g).
8 This assumption captures the idea that delinquents learn from other criminals belonging to the same network how to commit crime in a more efficient
way by sharing the know-how about the technology of crime (see Calvó-Armengol and Zenou, 2004).
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(ii) gk+1 = gk + i j for some i j such that Yi(gK , v) > Yi(gk, v) and Y j(gK , v)  Y j(gk, v).
If there exists a farsighted improving path from g to g′ , then we write g → g′ . For a given network g , let F (g) = {g′ ∈
G | g → g′}. This is the set of networks that can be reached by a farsighted improving path from g . Thus, g → g′ means
that g′ is the endpoint of at least one farsighted improving path from g . Notice that F (g) may contain many networks and
that a network g′ ∈ F (g) might be the endpoint of several farsighted improving paths starting in g . Since we are interested
in stability of networks, there will be no need to specify on which particular path players eventually agree. Rather F (g)
represents the networks that could possibly be reached by farsighted players when starting in g , and our concept of stability
takes these possible end networks into account in a way that we will make precise in Definition 4.
The notion of farsightedness is relevant whenever payoffs can only be reaped after some stable network has formed, or
when players are sufficiently patient so that they can safely ignore the payoffs that they obtain before a stable network
settles down. It lies at the other end of the spectrum than myopia, where only immediate payoffs count. An intermediate
(but difficult) approach is the one of Dutta et al. (2005), where the entire discounted stream of payoffs matters.
Suppose in Example 1 with φ smaller than 3/2 that the starting network g is a partial network like g1, g2, or g3. Then,
from g no myopic improving path results in the complete network. The problem is that the isolated player will loose from
making a link with any of the other players. However, there are farsighted improving paths that go to the complete network.
An example of the sequence of graphs on a farsighted improving path is (g1, g4, g7) when starting in g1. Similar farsighted
improving paths exist starting in any of the other partial networks. Examples of other farsighted improving paths starting in
g1 and ending in g7 are (g1, g4, g7), (g1, g5, g7), or even (g1, g0, g2, g6, g7). Moreover, from any g = g7 there is a farsighted
improving path going to g7. Thus, we observe that the partial networks are pairwise stable, but not stable when players are
farsighted. The complete network on the other hand is not only pairwise stable. It is also stable when players are farsighted.
We now introduce a new solution concept, the pairwise farsightedly stable set. The definition corresponds to the one of
a pairwise myopically stable set with myopic deviations replaced by farsighted deviations. It is obtained by requiring the
deterrence of farsighted external deviations, farsighted external stability, and minimality. More precisely, a set of networks G
is pairwise farsightedly stable if (i) all possible pairwise deviations from any network g ∈ G to a network outside G are
deterred by a credible threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) there exists a farsighted improving path from any
network outside the set leading to some network in the set, and (iii) there is no proper subset of G satisfying conditions (i)
and (ii). Formally, pairwise farsightedly stable sets are defined as follows.
Definition 4. A set of networks G ⊆ G is pairwise farsightedly stable with respect v and Y if
(i) ∀ g ∈ G ,
(ia) ∀i j /∈ g such that g + i j /∈ G , ∃g′ ∈ F (g + i j) ∩ G such that (Yi(g′, v), Y j(g′, v)) = (Yi(g, v), Y j(g, v)) or Yi(g′, v) <
Yi(g, v) or Y j(g′, v) < Y j(g, v),
(ib) ∀i j ∈ g such that g − i j /∈ G , ∃g′, g′′ ∈ F (g − i j) ∩ G such that Yi(g′, v)  Yi(g, v) and Y j(g′′, v)  Y j(g, v),
(ii) ∀g′ ∈ G \ G, F (g′) ∩ G = ∅.
(iii) G ′  G such that G ′ satisfies conditions (ia), (ib), and (ii).
Condition (ia) in Definition 4 captures that adding a link i j to a network g ∈ G that leads to a network outside of G , is
deterred by the threat of ending in g′ . Here g′ is such that there is a farsighted improving path from g + i j to g′ . Moreover,
g′ belongs to G , which makes g′ a credible threat. Condition (ib) is a similar requirement, but then for the case where a link
is severed. Condition (ii) in Definition 4 requires external stability and implies that the networks within the set are robust to
perturbations. From any network outside G there is a farsightedly stable path leading to some network in G .9 Condition (ii)
implies that if a set of networks is pairwise farsightedly stable, it is non-empty. Notice that the set G (trivially) satisfies
conditions (ia), (ib), and (ii) in Definition 4. This motivates the requirement of a minimality condition, namely condition (iii).
Theorem 2. A pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks exists.
Proof. Notice that G satisfies conditions (i) and (ii). Let us proceed by contradiction. Assume that there does not exist
any set of networks G ⊆ G that is pairwise farsightedly stable. This means that for any G0 ⊆ G that satisfies conditions (i)
and (ii) in Definition 4, we can find a proper subset G1 that satisfies conditions (i) and (ii). Iterating this reasoning we
can build an infinite decreasing sequence {Gk}k0 of subsets of G satisfying conditions (i) and (ii). But since G has finite
cardinality, this is not possible. 
We show next that in Example 1 with n = 3, the set consisting of the complete network is the unique pairwise farsight-
edly stable set whatever the fine φ.
9 There are some random dynamic models of network formation that are based on incentives to form links such as Watts (2002), Jackson and Watts
(2002), and Tercieux and Vannetelbosch (2006). These models aim to use the random process to select from the set of pairwise stable networks.
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{g1, g3, g7}, F (g3) = {g1, g2, g7}, F (g4) = {g1, g2, g3, g7}, F (g5) = {g1, g2, g3, g7}, F (g6) = {g1, g2, g3, g7}, and F (g7) = ∅.
Notice that the analysis of farsighted improving paths can be intricate. The only way to go from g1 to g2 is via g4. At the
same time it holds that g4 /∈ F (g1). Indeed, players 1 and 2 make a link to go from g1 to the intermediate network g4 in
the anticipation that player 3 will subsequently delete his link with player 1. To go from g1 to the terminal network g4 is a
strict deterioration for players 2 and 3. The only thing player 1 can do is to sever his link with player 2, which leads to g0.
This is not helpful for player 1, since once at g0 he is still the only one that is better off at g4 compared to g0, and there is
nothing that he can do anymore.
We show next that {g7} is pairwise farsightedly stable. Since g7 ∈ ⋂g∈G\{g7} F (g), condition (ii) of the definition is clearly
satisfied. Moreover, condition (i) is satisfied, since any deviation from g7 may lead back to g7. Clearly, {g7} is minimal, so
condition (iii) is satisfied too.
There are no other pairwise farsightedly stable sets. Since F (g7) = ∅, condition (ii) implies that g7 belongs to any pair-
wise farsightedly stable set. Since {g7} is pairwise farsightedly stable, using condition (iii) it follows that {g7} is the only
pairwise farsightedly stable set.
Take now φ  3/2. For 3/2  φ  3 we have F (g0) = {g1, g2, g3, g4, g5, g6, g7}, F (g1) = {g4, g5, g7}, F (g2) =
{g4, g6, g7}, F (g3) = {g5, g6, g7}, F (g4) = {g7}, F (g5) = {g7}, F (g6) = {g7}, and F (g7) = ∅. For φ > 3 we have F (g0) =
{g1, g2, g3, g4, g5, g6, g7}, F (g1) = {g4, g5, g6, g7}, F (g2) = {g4, g5, g6, g7}, F (g3) = {g4, g5, g6, g7}, F (g4) = {g7}, F (g5) =
{g7}, F (g6) = {g7}, and F (g7) = ∅. So, g7 ∈ ⋂g∈G\{g7} F (g) for φ  3/2. Since F (g7) = ∅, we can use the same arguments as
in the case φ < 3/2 and can therefore conclude that {g7} is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set.
5. Characterizations of pairwise farsightedly stable sets
The next theorem provides an easy to verify condition for a set G to be pairwise farsightedly stable.
Theorem 3. If for every g′ ∈ G \ G we have F (g′) ∩ G = ∅ and for every g ∈ G, F (g) ∩ G = ∅, then G is a pairwise farsightedly stable
set.
Proof. Condition (ii) is trivially satisfied.
Suppose condition (i) is not satisfied. Then there is g ∈ G and a deviation to g′ /∈ G such that every g′′ ∈ F (g′) ∩ G
defeats g . In particular, it then follows that g′′ ∈ F (g), a contradiction, since by assumption there is no g′′ ∈ G with that
property. Consequently, condition (i) holds.
To verify condition (iii), suppose there is a proper subset G ′ of G that satisfies conditions (i) and (ii). Let g be in G but
not in G ′ . Then F (g) ∩ G ′ ⊆ F (g) ∩ G = ∅, where the equality follows by the assumption in the theorem. It follows that G ′
violates condition (ii), leading to a contradiction. We have shown that G is minimal. 
Later on in the paper, we will show by means of Example 3 that Theorem 3 cannot be extended to an “if and only if”
statement. The “if and only if” statement is true, however, when restricting the scope of the theorem to sets consisting of a
single network.
Theorem 4. The set {g} is a pairwise farsightedly stable set if and only if for every g′ ∈ G \ {g} we have g ∈ F (g′).
Proof. If {g} is a pairwise farsightedly stable set, then by condition (ii) in Definition 4 it follows that g ∈ F (g′) for every
g′ ∈ G \ {g}.
Now suppose that for every g′ ∈ G \ {g} we have g ∈ F (g′). Condition (ii) is trivially satisfied. Since g ∈ F (g + i j) and
g ∈ F (g − i j), conditions (ia) and (ib) hold. Finally, condition (iii) is satisfied because {g} is a singleton. 
Theorem 4 tells us that {g} is a pairwise farsightedly stable set if and only if there exists a farsighted improving path
from any network leading to g . Condition (iii) of the definition implies that if {g} is a pairwise farsightedly stable set,
then g does not belong to any other pairwise farsightedly stable set. But there may be pairwise farsightedly stable sets not
containing g .
The next result provides a full characterization for unique pairwise farsightedly stable sets.
Theorem 5. The set G is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set if and only if G = {g ∈ G | F (g) = ∅} and for every g′ ∈ G \ G,
F (g′) ∩ G = ∅.
Proof. (⇐) Condition (ii) of Definition 4 is trivially satisfied. Suppose condition (i) is not satisfied. Then there is g ∈ G and
i j /∈ g such that g + i j /∈ G and for every g′ ∈ F (g + i j) ∩ G it holds that (Yi(g′, v), Y j(g′, v)) > (Yi(g, v), Y j(g, v)), or there
is g ∈ G and i j ∈ g such that g − i j /∈ G and for every g′ ∈ F (g + i j) ∩ G it holds that Yi(g′, v) > Yi(g, v). In both cases
it follows that g′ ∈ F (g), a contradiction, since by assumption F (g) = ∅. Consequently, condition (i) holds. Since for every
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condition (iii) that G is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set.
(⇒) Condition (ii) yields that for every g′ ∈ G \ G, F (g′) ∩ G = ∅. From this it also follows that every g with F (g) = ∅
belongs to G. It remains to be shown that for every g ∈ G, F (g) = ∅. Suppose not. Let g∗ and g′ be such that g∗ ∈ G and
g′ ∈ F (g∗). Consider G ′ = {g′} ∪ {g ∈ G | g′ /∈ F (g)}. Notice that g∗ /∈ G ′ and that for any g /∈ G ′ we have that g′ ∈ F (g).
Claim: G ′ satisfies conditions (i) and (ii).
Since for any g /∈ G ′ we have that g′ ∈ F (g), condition (ii) is satisfied. Consider any pairwise deviation from g′ to g′′ /∈ G ′ .
By construction of G ′ , g′ ∈ F (g′′) and the deviation is deterred. Consider any pairwise deviation from any g0 ∈ G ′ \ {g′} to
some g′′ /∈ G ′ . Suppose that all g ∈ F (g′′) ∩ G ′ are preferred by the player(s) initially deviating from g0. Then it follows that
F (g′′)∩ G ′ ⊆ F (g0). By definition of G ′ , g′ ∈ F (g′′), so g′ ∈ F (g′′)∩ G ′ ⊆ F (g0), contradicting g′ /∈ F (g0) for any g0 ∈ G ′ \ {g′}.
Consequently, all pairwise deviations from g0 ∈ G ′ \ {g′} are deterred. Since we already showed that pairwise deviations
from g′ are deterred too, the set G ′ satisfies condition (i).
Finally, if G ′ satisfies condition (iii), then G ′ is a pairwise farsightedly stable set, a contradiction to the uniqueness of G .
If G ′ does not satisfy condition (iii), then, following the reasoning in the proof of Theorem 2, there is a proper subset G ′′
of G ′ satisfying conditions (i)–(iii). Since g∗ ∈ G \ G ′′, it holds that G = G ′′ and we obtain a contradiction to the uniqueness
of G . 
Theorem 5 implies that if G is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set and the network g belongs to G , then F (g) = ∅,
which implies that g is pairwise stable. Thus, pairwise farsighted stability is a refinement of pairwise stability when there
is a unique pairwise farsightedly stable set.
From Theorem 5 we obtain the following corollary that provides the necessary and sufficient conditions such that there
is a unique pairwise farsightedly stable set consisting of a single network.
Corollary 1. The set {g} is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set if and only if for every g′ ∈ G \ {g} we have g ∈ F (g′) and
F (g) = ∅.
If for every g′ ∈ G \ {g} we have g ∈ F (g′), then by Theorem 4 {g} is a pairwise farsightedly stable set. If, moreover,
F (g) = ∅, then {g} is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set by Corollary 1. If, on the other hand, F (g) = ∅, then there
is another pairwise farsightedly stable set by Corollary 1.
Using Theorem 4 we prove that in the example of criminal networks with n players, the complete network {gN} is a
pairwise farsightedly stable set.
Proposition 1. In the criminal networks model, the set {gN} is a pairwise farsightedly stable set.
Proof. We show that for every g ∈ G \ {gN} we have gN ∈ F (g). (1) We show that from any g = gN there is always a player
who wants to delete a link looking forward to gN . This enables us to build a sequence of networks where at each step
some player (who is looking forward to gN ) is deleting a link until we reach the empty network. (2) Next, starting from the
empty network, we build up a sequence of networks towards gN so that, at each step, links are only added, and players
that are adding links are strictly better off at gN compared to the current network. Then, (1) and (2) implies that from any
possible network there is a farsighted improving path leading to the complete network gN .
In the complete network we have that Yi(gN) = yi(gN) = B/n because pi(gN) = 0 for all i ∈ N . Notice that expected
payoffs of members of a component do not depend on how other components are structured (are linked). They only depend
on the number of links and on the number of criminals within the component. That is, criminal i who belongs to group
S ∈ Π(g) will get Yi(g) = yi(g)[1 − pi(g)φ] = (|S|/n)αi(g)B[1 − (n − 1 − ni)φ/n], with αi(g) = [#{ j ∈ S | n j = n(S)}]−1 if
ni = n(S) and αi(g) = 0 otherwise.
(1) Take any g = gN . Case 1: For all S ∈ Π(g), for every i, j ∈ S, we have that ni = n j . Then, for every i ∈ N , Yi(g) =
B/n[1 − (n − 1 −ni)φ/n] < B/n = Yi(gN) and thus everyone who has a link is willing to delete a link looking forward to gN .
Case 2: There exists S ∈ Π(g) such that ni < n(S). Then, player i gets Yi(g) = 0, so i wants to delete a link looking forward
to gN . We can repeat the arguments of Cases 1 and 2 until we reach the empty network.
(2) Once we have reached the empty network we build up a sequence of networks towards gN as follows. For k =
1, . . . ,n, we successively build networks so that the subset of players {1, . . . ,k} forms a complete component, and players
k + 1, . . . ,n are singletons (do not have any link). We start with the empty network denoted g1. Adding to g1 the link {1,2}
leads to the network g2. Notice that {1,2} is a complete component of g2, whereas players 3, . . . ,n are singletons. Let gk ,
for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, be a network such that the subset of players {1, . . . ,k} forms a complete component, and players
k +1, . . . ,n are singletons. To gk we add successively the links {1,k +1}, {2,k +1}, . . . , {k,k +1} to obtain the network gk+1.
Along this sequence of networks, the players that are adding a link are strictly better off at gN compared to what they obtain
at the current network. Indeed, when involved in adding a link, player 1 has a payoff of B/n[1 − (n − k)φ/n] < B/n, player
k + 1 has a payoff of B/n[1 − (n − 1)φ/n] < B/n (before linking to player 1) or 0 (before linking to players {2, . . . ,k}), and
the other players have a payoff of 0.
Thus, for all g = gN we have gN ∈ F (g). Applying Theorem 4, we conclude that {gN} is a pairwise farsightedly stable
set. 
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6. The symmetric connections model and the co-author model
Example 2 (Symmetric connections model). (See Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).) Players form links with each other in order
to exchange information. If player i is connected to player j by a path of t links, then player i receives a payoff of δt from
his indirect connection with player j. It is assumed that 0 < δ < 1, and so the payoff δt decreases as the path connecting
players i and j increases; thus information that travels a long distance becomes diluted and is less valuable than information
obtained from a closer neighbor. Each direct link i j results in a cost c to both i and j. This cost can be interpreted as the









where t(i j) is the number of links in the shortest path between i and j (setting t(i j) = ∞ if there is no path between i
and j).
In Fig. 2 we have depicted the 3-player case where (i) for c < δ(1 − δ), the complete network (g7 in Fig. 2) is the unique
pairwise stable network and {g7} is the pairwise myopically stable set, (ii) for δ(1 − δ) < c < δ, the star networks (g4, g5, g6
in Fig. 2) are pairwise stable and {g4, g5, g6} is the pairwise myopically stable set, and (iii) for c > δ, the empty network is
the unique pairwise stable network and {g0} is the pairwise myopically stable set.
Applying our concept of pairwise farsightedly stable sets to the symmetric connections model with three players, we
obtain that a network g is pairwise stable if and only if {g} is a pairwise farsightedly stable set. First we consider the
case c < δ(1 − δ). It holds that F (g0) = {g1, g2, g3, g4, g5, g6, g7}, F (g1) = {g4, g5, g6, g7}, F (g2) = {g4, g5, g6, g7}, F (g3) =
{g4, g5, g6, g7}, F (g4) = {g5, g6, g7}, F (g5) = {g4, g6, g7}, F (g6) = {g4, g5, g7}, and F (g7) = ∅. Now it follows by Corollary 1
that {g7} is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set.
Next we consider the case δ(1 − δ) < c < δ. It holds that F (g0) = {g1, g2, g3, g4, g5, g6}, F (g1) = {g4, g5, g6}, F (g2) =
{g4, g5, g6}, F (g3) = {g4, g5, g6}, F (g4) = {g5, g6}, F (g5) = {g4, g6}, F (g6) = {g4, g5}, and F (g7) = {g4, g5, g6}.
By a repeated application of Theorem 4, it follows that {g4}, {g5}, and {g6} are pairwise farsightedly stable sets.
Finally, we examine the case c > δ. One may verify that F (g0) = ∅, F (g1) = {g0}, F (g2) = {g0}, F (g3) = {g0}, F (g4) =
{g0, g1, g2}, F (g5) = {g0, g1, g3}, F (g6) = {g0, g2, g3}, and F (g7) = {g0, g1, g2, g3, g4, g5, g6}. It follows by Corollary 1 that
{g0} is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set.
Example 3 (Co-author model). (See Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).) Each player is a researcher who spends time writing
papers. If two players are connected, then they are working on a paper together. The amount of time researcher i spends on













for ni > 0. For ni = 0 we assume that Yi(g) = 0. In Fig. 3 we have depicted the 3-player case. It is easily verified that
the complete network g7 is the unique pairwise stable network. Moreover, it is easy to demonstrate that the pairwise
myopically stable set is {g7}.
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No singleton set is pairwise farsightedly stable in Example 3. Indeed, there is no network such that there is a farsighted
improving path from any other network leading to it. More precisely, F (g0) = {g1, g2, g3, g4, g5, g6}, F (g1) = {g4, g5},
F (g2) = {g4, g6}, F (g3) = {g5, g6}, F (g4) = {g7}, F (g5) = {g7}, F (g6) = {g7}, and F (g7) = ∅. However, a set formed by
the complete and two star networks is a pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks. The pairwise farsightedly stable sets
are {g4, g5, g7}, {g4, g6, g7}, {g5, g6, g7}, and {g1, g2, g3, g7} in the co-author model with three players.
7. Efficiency and farsighted stability
We now turn to the question of the relationship between farsighted stability and efficiency of networks. A first result
is that the set of pairwise farsightedly stable networks and the set of strongly efficient networks, those which are socially
optimal, may be disjoint for all allocation rules that are component balanced and anonymous.10
Theorem 6. There exists a value function such that for every component balanced and anonymous rule, strongly efficient networks are
not included in any of the pairwise farsightedly stable sets.
Proof. Take the following value function defined for any g ∈ G: v({12,13,23}) = 9, v({12,13}) = 0, v({12,23}) = 0,
v({13,23}) = 0, v({12}) = 8, v({13}) = 8, v({23}) = 8, and v(∅) = 0. Fix any component balanced and anonymous allocation
rule Y . Then, by component balance and anonymity,
(i) Y1({12,13,23}, v) = Y2({12,13,23}, v) = Y3({12,13,23}, v) = 3,
(ii) Y1({12,23}, v) = c, Y3({12,23}, v) = c, Y2({12,23}, v) = −2c, Y2({12,13}, v) = c, Y3({12,13}, v) = c, Y1({12,13}, v) =
−2c, Y1({13,23}, v) = c, Y2({13,23}, v) = c, Y3({13,23}, v) = −2c,
(iii) Y1({12}, v) = Y2({12}, v) = 4, Y3({12}, v) = 0, Y1({13}, v) = Y3({13}, v) = 4, Y2({13}, v) = 0, Y2({23}, v) = Y3({23}, v) =
4, Y1({23}, v) = 0, and
(iv) Y1(∅, v) = Y2(∅, v) = Y3(∅, v) = 0.
The unique strongly efficient network is {12,13,23}. We have:
(i) F (∅) = {{12}, {13}, {23}, {12,13,23}};
(ii) F ({12}) = {{13}, {23}}, F ({13}) = {{12}, {23}}, F ({23}) = {{12}, {13}};
(iii) For c < 3, F ({12,13}) = {{12}, {13}, {23}, {12,13,23}}, for 3  c < 4, F ({12,13}) = {{12}, {13}, {23}}, and for c  4,
F ({12,13}) = {{12}, {13}}. Next, for c < 3, F ({12,23}) = {{12}, {13}, {23}, {12,13,23}}, for 3  c < 4, F ({12,23}) = {{12},
{13}, {23}}, and for c  4, F ({12,23}) = {{12}, {23}}. And, for c < 3, F ({13,23}) = {{12}, {13}, {23}, {12,13,23}}, for
3  c < 4, F ({13,23}) = {{12}, {13}, {23}}, and for c  4, F ({13,23}) = {{13}, {23}};
(iv) For c < 3, F ({12,13,23}) = {{12}, {13}, {23}, {12,13}, {12,23}, {13,23}}, for c  3, F ({12,13,23}) = {{12}, {13}, {23}}.
Thus, {{12}}, {{13}}, and {{23}} are the only pairwise farsightedly stable sets. 
10 Bhattacharya (2005) has obtained a similar result with respect to the notion of the largest consistent set.
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A second result considers the case where there is a network that strictly Pareto dominates all other networks. That is,
if there is a network g such that for all g′ ∈ G \ {g} it holds that, for all i, Yi(g, v) > Yi(g′, v). Although the network that
strictly Pareto dominates all others is pairwise stable, there might be many more pairwise stable networks. We will show
in Section 8 that also the concept of the largest pairwise consistent set suffers from a similar defect. The following result
asserts that pairwise farsighted stability singles out the Pareto dominating network as the unique pairwise farsightedly
stable set.
Theorem 7. If there is a network g that strictly Pareto dominates all other networks, then {g} is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable
set.
Proof. It is immediate that g ∈ F (g′) for all g′ ∈ G \ {g} and that F (g) = ∅. Corollary 1 leads to the desired result. 
We next provide sufficient conditions on the allocation rule and/or the value function such that there is no conflict
between strong efficiency and farsighted stability.
An immediate application of Theorem 7 is the case of increasing returns to link creation as defined in Dutta et al.
(2005). This property requests that along every nested sequence of increasingly connected networks, there is a threshold
network for which the value turns nonnegative, and both aggregate as well as payoffs of individuals who form extra links
then increase as the network becomes even larger. Under this condition, and with a componentwise egalitarian allocation
rule, gN Pareto dominates all other networks, so Theorem 7 applies.
An allocation rule is said to be egalitarian if for every v ∈ V and g ∈ G, Yi(g, v) = v(g)/n. The following result follows
as a corollary to Theorem 7.
Corollary 2. Suppose that Y is the egalitarian rule and there is a unique strongly efficient network ge . Then, {ge} is the unique pairwise
farsightedly stable set.
8. The von Neumann–Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable set
The pairwise farsightedly stable set requires deterrence of external deviations, external stability, and minimality. The von
Neumann–Morgenstern stable set (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) imposes internal and external stability. Incorpo-
rating the notion of farsighted improving paths into the original definition of the von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set, we
obtain the von Neumann–Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable set.
Definition 5. The set G is a von Neumann–Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable set if (i) ∀g ∈ G , F (g) ∩ G = ∅ and
(ii) ∀g′ ∈ G \ G , F (g′) ∩ G = ∅.
Von Neumann–Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable sets do not always exist. Consider the situation where three
players can forms links and where the payoffs are given in Fig. 4. We have F (g0) = F (g7) = {g1, g2, g3, g4, g5, g6}, F (g1) =
{g2, g3}, F (g2) = {g3, g4, g5}, F (g3) = {g4, g5}, F (g4) = {g1, g5, g6}, F (g5) = {g1, g6}, F (g6) = {g1, g2, g3}. We prove that
there is no von Neumann–Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable set. Suppose on the contrary that G is a von Neumann–
Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable set. Suppose g1 ∈ G . The internal stability condition implies that no other network
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g1 /∈ G . A symmetric argument leads to the result that g3 /∈ G and g5 /∈ G . Suppose now that g2 ∈ G . The internal stability
condition implies that no other network can belong to G. Since F (g5)∩ {g2} = ∅ it follows that external stability is violated,
a contradiction. By symmetry it follows that g4 /∈ G and g6 /∈ G . Suppose g0 ∈ G . Internal stability implies that no other
network can belong to G. Since F (g1) ∩ {g0} = ∅, it follows that external stability is violated, a contradiction. By a similar
argument we can show that g7 /∈ G . The only remaining possibility is G = ∅. This clearly violates external stability. Thus,
there is no von Neumann–Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable set in this example. However, pairwise farsightedly
stable sets do exist by virtue of Theorem 2. The pairwise farsightedly stable sets are {g1, g2, g3}, {g3, g4, g5}, and {g1, g5, g6}.
From Theorem 3 we immediately obtain the following corollary, which states that a von Neumann–Morgenstern pairwise
farsightedly stable set is also a pairwise farsightedly stable set.
Corollary 3. If G is a von Neumann–Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable set, then G is a pairwise farsightedly stable set.
Since internal stability is automatically satisfied when a set of networks contains only one element, Theorem 4 leads to
the following corollary.
Corollary 4. The set {g} is a pairwise farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a von Neumann–Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable
set.
From Theorem 5 and Corollary 3 we immediately get the next result, which implies the converse of Corollary 3, a unique
pairwise farsightedly stable set is also a von Neumann–Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable set.
Corollary 5. If G is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set, then G is the unique von Neumann–Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly
stable set.
We have shown that replacing the internal stability condition in the von Neumann–Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly
stable set by deterrence of external deviations and minimality, leads to a stability concept that contains the von Neumann–
Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable set, and is always non-empty.
Example 1 (Criminal networks, n = 3 (continued)). Since {g7} is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set, Corollary 4 shows
that {g7} is the unique von Neumann–Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable set.
Example 3 (Co-author model (continued)). By Corollary 3 we have to analyze whether any of the pairwise farsightedly
stable sets is a von Neumann–Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable set. The unique von Neumann–Morgenstern pair-
wise farsightedly stable set is given by {g1, g2, g3, g7}. The other pairwise farsightedly stable sets {g4, g5, g7}, {g4, g6, g7},
{g5, g6, g7}, are not von Neumann–Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable sets because they do not satisfy the internal
stability condition.
9. The largest pairwise consistent set
In this section we study the relationship between pairwise farsighted stability and the largest pairwise consistent set,
a concept that has been defined in Chwe (1994) for general social environments. By considering a network as a social
environment, and by allowing only pairwise deviations, we obtain the definition of the largest pairwise consistent set.
Definition 6. G is a pairwise consistent set if ∀g ∈ G ,
(ia) ∀i j /∈ g , ∃g′ ∈ G , where g′ = g + i j or g′ ∈ F (g + i j) ∩ G, such that Yi(g′, v) < Yi(g, v) or Y j(g′, v) < Y j(g, v) or
(Yi(g′, v), Y j(g′, v)) = (Yi(g, v), Y j(g, v)),
(ib) ∀i j ∈ g , ∃g′, g′′ ∈ G , where g′ = g − i j or g′ ∈ F (g − i j) ∩ G, and g′′ = g − i j or g′′ ∈ F (g − i j) ∩ G, such that Yi(g′, v) 
Yi(g, v) and Y j(g′′, v)  Y j(g, v).
The largest pairwise consistent set is the pairwise consistent set that contains any pairwise consistent set.
The set G is a pairwise consistent set if both external and internal deviations are deterred. The largest pairwise consistent
set is the set that contains any pairwise consistent set. It follows from the results in Chwe (1994) that the largest pairwise
consistent set exists, is non-empty, and satisfies external stability.
Our pairwise farsightedly stable sets need not be consistent in the sense of Chwe (1994) since we do not require internal
deviations to be deterred. Moreover a pairwise consistent set does not necessarily satisfies the external stability condition.
Only the largest pairwise consistent set is guaranteed to satisfy external stability.
Whenever G is a von Neumann–Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable set, G is also a pairwise farsightedly stable set
(Corollary 3) and a largest pairwise consistent set (see Chwe, 1994). Replacing the internal and external stability conditions
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should be deterred, Chwe (1994) has proposed a stability concept that always exists and that contains the von Neumann–
Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable set. In this paper, replacing the internal stability condition by the condition that
external deviations should be deterred and the minimality condition, we propose another stability concept that also contains
the von Neumann–Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable set.
Chwe (1994) provides the following iterative procedure to find the largest consistent set. Let Z 0 ≡ G. Then, Zk (k =
1,2, . . .) is inductively defined as follows: g ∈ Zk−1 belongs to Zk with respect to Y and v if
(ia) ∀i j /∈ g , ∃g′ ∈ Zk−1, where g′ = g + i j or g′ ∈ F (g + i j) such that Yi(g′, v) < Yi(g, v) or Y j(g′, v) < Y j(g, v) or
(Yi(g′, v), Y j(g′, v)) = (Yi(g, v), Y j(g, v)).
(ib) ∀i j ∈ g , ∃g′, g′′ ∈ Zk−1, where g′ = g − i j or g′ ∈ F (g − i j), and g′′ = g − i j or g′′ ∈ F (g − i j), such that Yi(g′, v)  Yi(g, v)
and Y j(g′′, v)  Y j(g, v).
The largest pairwise consistent set is given by
⋂
k1 Z
k . That is, a network g ∈ Zk−1 is stable (at step k) and belongs
to Zk , if all possible pairwise deviations are deterred. Consider a pairwise deviation from g that involves making the link i j.
There might be further pairwise deviations which end up at g′ , where g + i j → g′ . If either i or j is worse off at g′ or both
are equally well off compared to the original network g , then the pairwise deviation is deterred. Similarly for a pairwise
deviation from g that involves deleting the link i j. There might be further pairwise deviations which end up at g′ and g′′
where g − i j → g′ and g − i j → g′′ . If i is equally well or worse off at g′ and j is equally well or worse off at g′′ compared
to the original network g , then the pairwise deviation is deterred. Since G is finite, there exists m ∈ N such that Zk = Zm
for all k  m, and Zm is the largest pairwise consistent set.
The next result states that if a network is not in the largest pairwise consistent set, it cannot be a pairwise farsightedly
stable set of networks.
Theorem 8. If {g} is a pairwise farsightedly stable set, then g belongs to the largest pairwise consistent set.
Proof. Since {g} is a pairwise farsightedly stable set we have that for all i j /∈ g: g ∈ F (g + i j) and for all i j ∈ g: g ∈ F (g − i j).
So g ∈ Z 1. By induction, g ∈ Zk for k  1. So, g belongs to the largest pairwise consistent set. 
Remember that two networks g and g′ are adjacent if they differ by one link. The value function v and allocation rule
Y exhibit no indifference if for any g and g′ that are adjacent either g defeats g′ or g′ defeats g .
Theorem 9. Suppose that Y and v exhibit no indifference. If g is pairwise stable then it belongs to the largest pairwise consistent set.
Proof. Since Y and v exhibit no indifference, we have that a pairwise stable network g defeats (i) g + i j for all i j /∈ g and
(ii) g − i j for all i j ∈ g . Thus, g ∈ F (g + i j) and g ∈ F (g − i j). So g ∈ Z 1. By induction g ∈ Zk for k  1. So, g belongs to the
largest pairwise consistent set. 
We claimed in Section 7 that even if there is a network that strictly Pareto dominates all other networks, the largest
pairwise consistent set may contain other networks. It is not difficult to construct examples where the no indifference
property holds, and some network strictly Pareto dominates all others. Moreover, such an example can be constructed such
that inefficient networks are pairwise stable. It then follows from Theorem 9 that such a network also belongs to the largest
pairwise consistent set. By virtue of Theorem 7, such a network does not belong to any pairwise farsightedly stable set.
Let us calculate the largest pairwise consistent set in two examples.
Example 1 (Criminal networks, n = 3, φ < 3/2 (continued)). We apply the iterative procedure of Chwe (1994) to find the
largest pairwise consistent set. We start with Z 0 = {g0, g1, . . . , g7}.
Starting in g0, players 1 and 2 can add the link {1,2} to move to g2. The indirect dominance relation implies that from
there it is only possible to end up in g1, g3, or g7. In all these networks both players have at least the same payoffs as
in g0, and at least one player has strictly higher payoffs. It follows that g0 /∈ Z 1. Any deviation from g1 may lead back to
g1 and is thereby deterred, so g1 ∈ Z 1. By symmetry it holds that g2, g3 ∈ Z 1. Starting in g4, players 2 and 3 can add the
link {2,3}, resulting in g7. Since F (g7) = ∅ and both players have higher payoffs in g7 than in g4, we find that g4 /∈ Z 1. By
symmetry it holds that g5, g6 /∈ Z 1. Any deviation from g7 may lead back to g7 and is thereby deterred, so g7 ∈ Z 1. The
same arguments can be used to show that Z 2 = Z 1. It follows that the largest pairwise consistent set equals {g1, g2, g3, g7}.
Theorem 8 implies that g7 belongs to the largest pairwise consistent set. This example therefore demonstrates that the
largest pairwise consistent set may contain other networks too.
Example 3 (Co-author model (continued)). We apply the iterative procedure of Chwe (1994) to find the largest pairwise
consistent set. We start with Z 0 = {g0, g1, . . . , g7}. Starting in g0, players 1 and 2 can add the link {1,2} to move to g2. The
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The (no)-relationships among solution concepts for network stability.
Concept Example 1 Example 3
Pairwise myopically stable set {g1, g2, g3, g7} {g7}
Pairwise farsightedly stable set {g7} {g4, g5, g7}, {g4, g6, g7}, {g5, g6, g7}, {g1, g2, g3, g7}
vN–M farsighted stable set {g7} {g1, g2, g3, g7}
Largest pairwise consistent set {g1, g2, g3, g7} {g1, g2, g3, g7}
indirect dominance relation implies that from there it is only possible to reach g4 or g6. In all these networks, players 1
and 2 have higher payoffs than at g0. It follows that g0 /∈ Z 1. Starting in g4, players 2 and 3 will add a link to move to g7.
Since F (g7) = ∅, no further moves will occur. Players 2 and 3 have higher payoffs at g7 than at g4. It follows that g4 /∈ Z 1.
For similar reasons, g5 /∈ Z 1 and g6 /∈ Z 1. It can be verified that Z 1 = {g1, g2, g3, g7}.
We show next that Z 2 = {g1, g2, g3, g7}. Starting in g1, players 1 and 2 may add a link to go to g4, a network not in Z 1.
From g4 the indirect dominance relation dictates a move to g7. In g7 player 1 is worse off than in g1. It follows that no
link will be added by them to g1. Repeating such arguments, it can be shown that Z 2 = {g1, g2, g3, g7} = Zk for all k  2.
It follows that the largest pairwise consistent set equals {g1, g2, g3, g7}.
Since the assumptions of Theorem 9 are satisfied in this example, it follows that g7 belongs to the largest pairwise
consistent set. The example shows that the largest pairwise consistent set may contain other networks too.
Table 1 summarizes our findings in Example 1 with n = 3 and φ < 3/2 and Example 3.
10. Conclusion
We have proposed a new concept, the pairwise farsightedly stable set, to predict which networks may be formed among
farsighted players. A set of networks G is pairwise farsightedly stable (i) if all possible pairwise deviations from any network
g ∈ G to a network outside G are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if there exists a farsighted
improving path from any network outside the set leading to some network in the set, and (iii) if there is no proper subset
of G satisfying conditions (i) and (ii). We have shown that a pairwise farsightedly stable set always exists and we provide
a full characterization of unique pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks. As a corollary we have given the necessary
and sufficient condition such that a unique pairwise farsightedly stable set consisting of a single network exists. We have
found that the pairwise farsightedly stable sets and the set of strongly efficient networks may be disjoint. Nevertheless,
contrary to other pairwise concepts, if there is a network that Pareto dominates all other networks, then that network is
the unique prediction of pairwise farsighted stability. We have also been able to provide some conditions on the allocation
rule and the value function such that pairwise farsighted stability singles out the strongly efficient network. Finally, we have
studied the relationship between pairwise farsighted stability and other concepts such as pairwise myopic stability, the von
Neumann–Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable set, and the largest pairwise consistent set. When there is a unique
pairwise farsightedly stable set, then its elements are also pairwise stable. Pairwise stable networks belong to the largest
pairwise consistent set when a mild no indifference criterion is satisfied. Moreover, any von Neumann–Morgenstern pairwise
farsightedly stable set is also a pairwise farsightedly stable set. A pairwise farsightedly stable set consisting of a unique
element is also a von Neumann–Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable set. If there is a unique pairwise farsightedly
stable set, then it is also the unique von Neumann–Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable set. By means of examples we
have shown that there is no general relationship between (i) pairwise farsightedly stable sets and pairwise myopically stable
sets and (ii) pairwise farsightedly stable sets and largest pairwise consistent sets.
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